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CDC’s 50th Anniversary — July 1, 1996
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—CDC—traces its roots to an
organization established in the southeastern United States during World War II
to prevent malaria among personnel training on U.S. military bases. On July 1,
1996, CDC formally celebrates its 50th anniversary as a federal agency dedicated
to ensuring the public’s health through close cooperation with state and local
health departments and with other organizations committed to improving health
in the United States and throughout the world.
To commemorate this anniversary, this issue of MMWR  presents reports that
offer special perspectives: a historical overview of CDC; national morbidity data
from June 8, 1946, and June 22, 1996; reprints of articles published in CDC’s
earlier years—reports about an outbreak of smallpox and an outbreak of penta-
chlorophenol poisoning in newborn infants; and information resources about
CDC. In addition, this issue reports the recent historic decision by the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists to designate the prevalence of cigarette
smoking as a notifiable condition for national public health surveillance. A “late-
breaking” report summarizes the investigation of a multistate outbreak of
Cyclospora  (an emerging pathogen) infection and underscores the continuing
need to address new public health threats. Subsequent issues of MMWR  this
year may include reprints of selected reports of historical interest.
CDC and its employees invite you to use CDC services and learn more about
CDC by visiting our site on the World-Wide Web (http://www.cdc.gov), by obtain-
ing copies of information resources listed in this issue of MMWR, and by visiting
the Global Health Odyssey exhibit at CDC headquarters in Atlanta.




History of CDC — ContinuedCDC, an institution sy onymous around the world with public health, will be
50 years old on July 1. The Communicable Disease Center was organized in Atlanta,
Georgia, on July 1, 1946; its founder, Dr. Joseph W. Mountin, was a visionary public
health leader who had high hopes for this small and comparatively insignificant
branch of the Public Health Service (PHS). It occupied only one floor of the Volunteer
Building on Peachtree Street and had fewer than 400 employees, most of whom were
engineers and entomologists. Until the previous day, they had worked for Malaria
Control in War Areas, the predecessor of CDC (Figure 1), which had successfully kept
the southeastern states malaria-free during World War II and, for approximately
1 year, from murine typhus fever. The new institution would expand its interests to
include all communicable diseases and would be the servant of the states, providing
practical help whenever called.
Distinguished scientists soon filled CDC’s laboratories, and many states and foreign
countries sent their public health staffs to Atlanta for training. Any tropical disease
with an insect vector and all those of zoological origin came within its purview. Dr.
Mountin was not satisfied with this progress, and he impatiently pushed the staff to
do more. He reminded them that except for tuberculosis and venereal disease, which
FIGURE 1. Malaria Control in War Areas, Henry Rose Carter Laboratory — Savannah,
Georgia, 1944
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had separate units in Washington, D.C., CDC was responsible for any communicable
disease. To survive, it had to become a center for epidemiology.
Medical epidemiologists were scarce, and it was not until 1949 that Dr. Alexander
Langmuir arrived to head the epidemiology branch. He saw CDC as “the promised
land,” full of possibilities. Within months, he launched the first-ever disease surveil-
lance program, which confirmed his suspicion that malaria, on which CDC spent the
largest portion of its budget, had long since disappeared. Subsequently, disease sur-
veillance became the cornerstone on which CDC’s mission of service to the states was
built and, in time, changed the practice of public health.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was the impetus for creating CDC’s Epi-
demic Intelligence Service (EIS). The threat of biological warfare loomed, and Dr.
Langmuir, the most knowledgeable person in PHS about this arcane subject, saw an
opportunity to train epidemiologists who would guard against ordinary threats to
public health while watching out for alien germs. The first class of EIS officers arrived
in Atlanta for training in 1951 and pledged to go wherever they were called for the next
2 years. These “disease detectives” quickly gained fame for “shoe-leather epidemiol-
ogy” through which they ferreted out the cause of disease outbreaks.
The survival of CDC as an institution was not at all certain in the 1950s. In 1947,
Emory University gave land on Clifton Road for a headquarters, but construction did
not begin for more than a decade. PHS was so intent on research and the rapid growth
of the National Institutes of Health that it showed little interest in what happened in
Atlanta. Congress, despite the long delay in appropriating money for new buildings,
was much more receptive to CDC’s pleas for support than either PHS or the Bureau of
the Budget.
Two major health crises in the mid-1950s established CDC’s credibility and ensured
its survival. In 1955, when poliomyelitis appeared in children who had received the
recently approved Salk vaccine, the national inoculation program was stopped. The
cases were traced to contaminated vaccine from a laboratory in California; the prob-
lem was corrected, and the inoculation program, at least for first and second graders,
was resumed. The resistance of these 6- and 7-year-olds to polio, compared with that
of older children, proved the effectiveness of the vaccine. Two years later, surveillance
was used again to trace the course of a massive influenza epidemic. From the data
gathered in 1957 and subsequent years, the national guidelines for influenza vaccine
were developed.
CDC grew by acquisition. The venereal disease program came to Atlanta in 1957
and with it the first Public Health Advisors, nonscience college graduates destined to
play an important role in making CDC’s disease-control programs work. The tubercu-
losis program moved in 1960, immunization practices and the MMWR  in 1961. The
Foreign Quarantine Service, one of the oldest and most prestigious units of PHS, came
in 1967; many of its positions were soon switched to other uses as better ways of
doing the work of quarantine, primarily through overseas surveillance, were devel-
oped. The long-established nutrition program also moved to CDC, as well as the Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and work of already established
units increased. Immunization tackled measles and rubella control; epidemiology
added family planning and surveillance of chronic diseases. When CDC joined the
international malaria-eradication program and accepted responsibility for protecting
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the earth from moon germs and vice versa, CDC’s mission stretched overseas and into
space.
CDC played a key role in one of the greatest triumphs of public health: the eradica-
tion of smallpox. In 1962 it established a smallpox surveillance unit, and a year later
tested a newly developed jet gun and vaccine in the Pacific island nation of Tonga.
After refining vaccination techniques in Brazil, CDC began work in Central and West
Africa in 1966. When millions of people there had been vaccinated, CDC used surveil-
lance to speed the work along. The World Health Organization used this “eradication
escalation” technique elsewhere with such success that global eradication of small-
pox was achieved by 1977. The United States spent only $32 million on the project,
about the cost of keeping smallpox at bay for 21⁄2  months.
CDC also achieved notable success at home tracking new and mysterious disease
outbreaks. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, it found the cause of Legionnaires dis-
ease and toxic-shock syndrome. A fatal disease, subsequently named acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), was first mentioned in the June 5, 1981, issue of
MMWR. Since then, MMWR  has published numerous follow-up articles about AIDS,
and one of the largest portions of CDC’s budget and staff is assigned to address this
disease.
Although CDC succeeded more often than it failed, it did not escape criticism. For
example, television and press reports about the Tuskegee study on long-term effects
of untreated syphilis in black men created a storm of protest in 1972. This study had
been initiated by PHS and other organizations in 1932 and was transferred to CDC in
1957. Although the effectiveness of penicillin as a therapy for syphilis had been estab-
lished during the late 1940s, participants in this study remained untreated until the
study was brought to public attention. CDC also was criticized because of the 1976
effort to vaccinate the U.S. population against swine flu, the infamous killer of 1918–
19. When some vaccinees developed Guillain-Barré syndrome, the campaign was
stopped immediately; the epidemic never occurred.
As the scope of CDC’s activities expanded far beyond communicable diseases, its
name had to be changed. In 1970 it became the Center for Disease Control, and in
1981, after extensive reorganization, Center became Centers. The words “and Preven-
tion” were added in 1992, but, by law, the well-known three-letter acronym was re-
tained. In health emergencies CDC means an answer to SOS calls from anywhere in
the world, such as the recent one from Zaire where Ebola fever raged.
Fifty years ago CDC’s agenda was noncontroversial (hardly anyone objected to the
pursuit of germs), and Atlanta was a backwater. In 1996, CDC’s programs are often tied
to economic, political, and social issues, and Atlanta is as near Washington as the tap
of a keyboard (Figure 2).
Adapted for MMWR by Elizabeth W. Etheridge, Ph.D., from her book, Sentinel for Health: A
History of the Centers for Disease Control. Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1992.
Editorial Note: When CDC’s name changed in 1970, from the Communicable Disease
Center to the Center for Disease Control, CDC scientists were poised to accept new
challenges. The most notable of the agency’s many achievements in the following
10 years was its role in global smallpox eradication, a program that finally succeeded
because of the application of scientific principles of surveillance to a complex prob-
lem. In the realm of infectious diseases, CDC maintained its preeminence, identifying
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the Ebola virus and the sexual transmission of hepatitis B, and isolating the hepatitis
C virus and the bacterium causing Legionnaires disease. The Study of the Effective-
ness of Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC) was the most expensive study the
agency had ever undertaken and proved for the first time the effectiveness of recom-
mended infection-control practices. Other studies included identification of the asso-
ciation of Reye syndrome with aspirin use, the relation between liver cancer and
occupational exposure to vinyl chloride, and the harmful effects of the popular liquid
protein diet.
The 1980s institutionalized what is considered to be a critically important scientific
activity at CDC—the collaboration of laboratorians and epidemiologists. The decade
began with the national epidemic of toxic-shock syndrome, documentation of the as-
sociation with a particular brand of tampons, and the subsequent withdrawal of that
brand from the market. CDC collaboration with the National Center for Health Statis-
tics (NCHS) resulted in the removal of lead from gasoline, which in turn has markedly
decreased this exposure in all segments of the population. The major public health
event of the 1980s was the emergence of AIDS. CDC helped lead the response to this
epidemic, including characterization of the syndrome and defining risk factors for dis-
ease.
CDC became involved in two very large epidemiologic studies during the 1980s.
First, the Cancer and Steroid Hormone Study conducted in collaboration with the Na-
tional Cancer Institute assessed the risks for breast, cervical, and ovarian cancers as-
sociated with both oral contraceptives and estrogen replacement therapy. Second, at
the request of Congress, CDC undertook a series of studies of the health effects of
FIGURE 2. CDC headquarters on Clifton Road — Atlanta, 1996
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service in Vietnam on veterans and their offspring, which led to a landmark contribu-
tion of the laboratory—the development of a serum test for dioxin able to measure the
toxicant in parts per quadrillion. This decade also introduced scientifically based rapid
assessment methods to disaster assistance and sentinel health event surveillance to
occupational public health. Epi Info, a software system for the practice of applied
epidemiology, was introduced and now has been translated into 12 languages for tens
of thousands of users globally. Finally, during the 1980s, NCHS was moved to CDC,
further enhancing CDC’s information capabilities to meet national needs.
The 1990s have been characterized by continuing applications of CDC’s classic
field-oriented epidemiology, as well as by the development of new methodologies.
For example, the disciplines of health economics and decision sciences were merged
to create a new area of emphasis—prevention effectiveness—as an approach for mak-
ing more rational choices for public health interventions. In 1993, the investigation of
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome required a melding between field epidemiology and
the need for sensitivity to and involvement of American Indians and their culture.
Similarly, the response to global problems with Ebola virus and plague underscore the
importance of adapting these new methodologies. Other major CDC contributions to
the world’s health include global polio eradication efforts and efforts to prevent neural
tube defects. Finally, in October 1992, Congress changed CDC’s official name to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to recognize CDC’s leadership role in pre-
vention. Today, CDC is both the nation’s prevention agency and a global leader in pub-
lic health. As the world enters the new millennium, CDC will remain the agency ready
to address the challenges to its vision of healthy people in a healthy world through
prevention.
Editorial Note by: Office of the Director, Epidemiology Program Office, CDC.
History of CDC — Continued
Historical Perspectives
Notifiable Disease Surveillance and Notifiable Disease Statistics —
United States, June 1946 and June 1996
Surveillance for Notifiable Diseases — ContinuedNational surveillance for infectious diseases is used to document the morbidity and
impact associated with these conditions in the United States. This report includes
morbidity data for the weeks ending June 8, 1946, and June 22, 1996, and describes
changes since 1946 both in the procedures for conducting surveillance and in the inci-
dence of selected diseases.
Surveillance Notes
The history of the reporting and tracking of diseases that could pose a risk to public
health in the United States dates back more than a century. In 1878, Congress author-
ized the U.S. Marine Hospital Service (the forerunner of today’s Public Health Service
[PHS]) to collect morbidity reports on cholera, smallpox, plague, and yellow fever
from U.S. consuls overseas; this information was used to institute quarantine meas-
ures to prevent the introduction and spread of these diseases into the United States.
In 1879, a specific Congressional appropriation was made for collecting and publish-
ing reports of these notifiable diseases. The authority for weekly reporting and publi-
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cation was expanded by Congress in 1893 to include data from states and municipal
authorities. By 1928, all states, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were
reporting 29 infectious diseases to the Surgeon General. 
Fifty years ago, morbidity statistics published each week were accompanied by the
statement “No health department, State or local, can effectively prevent or control
disease without knowledge of when, where, and under what conditions cases are oc-
curring.” These statistics appeared under the heading “Prevalence of Disease—
United States” in each issue of Public Health Reports  printed by PHS, Office of the
Surgeon General (Division of Public Health Methods) (see pages 533–6). In 1949, the
collection, compilation, and publication of these morbidity statistics was transferred
to the National Office of Vital Statistics, which produced the Weekly Morbidity Report.
In 1952 the publication was renamed Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, and re-
sponsibility for the publication was transferred to CDC in 1961.
In 1946, reports of notifiable diseases consisted of summary statistics, transmitted
by telegram each week by all state and some city health officers. The numbers were
tabulated and sent immediately by letter to each site for verification. Data published in
the June 28, 1946, issue of Public Health Reports  were for the week ending June 8,
1946 (see pages 533–6). Today, for most diseases, each state health department enters
individual case reports (rather than summary numbers) into a computer for transmis-
sion to CDC through the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveil-
lance; data published in this issue of MMWR  represent cumulative totals reported
through June 22, 1996. Except for New York City and Washington, D.C., morbidity data
from individual cities are no longer published weekly.
Because the reporting frequency varied for different conditions (i.e., weekly,
monthly, or annually), the precise number of conditions considered nationally report-
able in 1946 is unclear. The first list of 41 infectious diseases that all states agreed
should be nationally notifiable to PHS was developed at the first conference of state
and territorial epidemiologists in 1951 (1 ). This group was the forerunner of the Coun-
cil of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), now CDC’s primary collaborator for
determining what is nationally reportable. In 1951, as now, because reporting can be
mandated only at the state level, reporting to CDC by the states was voluntary. Today,
52 infectious diseases are notifiable nationally (2 ); in addition, at the 1995 CSTE meet-
ing, the first noninfectious condition—elevated blood lead levels—was added to the
list of conditions designated as reportable at a national level (3 ). On June 6, 1996,
CSTE added silicosis and acute pesticide poisoning/injuries to the list of nationally
reportable conditions. Also on June 6, CSTE unanimously agreed to include preva-
lence of cigarette smoking in the list of conditions designated as reportable by states
to CDC; this is the first time tobacco has been included and the first time a risk behav-
ior, rather than a disease or illness, has been included (see box, page 537).
Disease Notes
Comparing reports of notifiable conditions during June 1946 and June 1996 high-
lights some of the differences in the prevalent or common diseases. For example,
50 years ago, in the fundamentally prevaccine era, for the week ending June 8, 1946,
health departments reported 161 cases of poliomyelitis, 229 cases of diphtheria, 1886
cases of pertussis, and 25,041 cases of measles (see page 534–6). Through the week
ending June 22, 1996, a cumulative total of no confirmed cases of polio, one case of
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diphtheria, 1419 cases of pertussis, and 263 cases of measles have been reported for
1996. Since 1946, vaccines have been licensed for all four of these conditions: diph-
theria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine in 1949, inactivated polio vaccine in
1955 and live attenuated vaccine in 1961, and measles vaccine in 1963. Because of the
advent of these and other disease-control strategies, during the past decade public
health authorities have established as targets for the year 2000 eradication of polio
globally and measles elimination in the Americas. Four cases of another vaccine-pre-
ventable disease, smallpox, were reported for the week ending June 8, 1946, and a
total of 337 cases for the entire year of 1946; the last documented cases of smallpox in
the United States occurred 3 years later, in 1949. In 1958, the World Health Organiza-
tion targeted smallpox for global eradication, a campaign that was declared success-
ful in 1980 (4 ). 
Among the 10 nationally notifiable infectious diseases that are most commonly
reportable today, several were unknown in June 1946. The 10 most frequent nationally
reportable infectious conditions in 1994 (the most recent year for which final data are
available) were, in descending order, gonorrhea, acquired immunodeficiency syn-
drome (AIDS), salmonellosis, shigellosis, hepatitis A, tuberculosis, primary and secon-
dary syphilis, Lyme disease, hepatitis B, and pertussis (5 ). Fifty years ago, AIDS and
Lyme disease were unknown. “Infectious hepatitis” (subsequently identified as hepa-
titis A) had just been identified, and morbidity reports for this condition first appeared
in 1947. In 1953, serum hepatitis (subsequently named hepatitis B) was recognized as
a separate entity, although it was included in the general category of hepatitis until
1966, when infectious and serum hepatitis began to be reported separately. Other dis-
eases reported on a weekly basis during 1946 included amebiasis, murine typhus fe-
ver, and tularemia; during the past 10 years, these three conditions were deleted from
the nationally notifiable disease list and are no longer routinely reported to CDC.
Because of the acknowledged underreporting of most diseases (particularly those
typically characterized by clinically mild illness) to this passive surveillance system,
the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) does not capture all
cases of disease nationwide. However, these data are essential for monitoring disease
trends and for determining relative disease burdens. In addition, this same NNDSS—
with origins dating more than a century ago—continues to be used for monitoring the
decline in incidence of vaccine-preventable and other diseases and to detect and
document the appearance of new public health problems.
Reported by: Systems Operations and Information Br, Div of Surveillance and Epidemiology,
Epidemiology Program Office, CDC.
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Addition of Prevalence of Cigarette Smoking
as a Nationally Notifiable Condition — June 1996
On June 6, 1996, by a unanimous vote, the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE) added prevalence of cigarette smoking to the list of con-
ditions designated as reportable by states to CDC. The addition of prevalence of
cigarette smoking marks the first time a behavior, rather than a disease or ill-
ness, has been considered nationally reportable.
Goals of smoking prevalence surveillance identified by CSTE include moni-
toring trends in tobacco use, guiding allocation of tobacco-use prevention re-
sources, and evaluating public health interventions to reduce smoking. Given
these goals, CSTE selected population sampling as the appropriate surveillance
methodology and designated the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) as the preferred data source. CSTE and CDC are developing the format
to regularly present this information in national disease reporting statistics. The
addition of cigarette smoking prevalence brings to 56 the number of diseases
and conditions designated by CSTE as reportable by states to CDC. 
Reported by: Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists. Office on Smoking and
Health, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion; Div of
Surveillance and Epidemiology, Epidemiology Program Office, CDC.
Editorial Note: National notifiable disease surveillance has been critical to the
successful campaign against infectious diseases throughout this century. By
agreement among states, CSTE, in partnership with CDC, determines the list of
conditions reportable to CDC. The addition of prevalence of cigarette smoking to
this list is a historic step in the evolution of the public health surveillance in the
United States.
Although most conditions reportable by states to CDC have been acute infec-
tious diseases, and surveillance for such diseases remains a public health prior-
ity, the addition of prevalence of cigarette smoking reflects shifts in morbidity
and mortality patterns in the United States and therefore the need to expand the
range of nationally reportable conditions. Traditionally, infectious disease re-
porting has relied on a single methodology—mandated reporting of all cases.
The decision by CSTE to designate BRFSS as the recommended data source for
reporting of this condition marks a transition to a more flexible system in which
surveillance methods are determined by surveillance goals. Most importantly,
this action underscores the role of tobacco use as the leading preventable cause
of death in the United States and the need to conduct national public health
surveillance for both conventional disease outcomes and for underlying causes
(e.g., smoking and other risky behaviors) amenable to public health interven-
tion (1 ).
Reference
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International Notes — Quarantine Measures
Smallpox — Stockholm, Sweden, 1963
Reprinted below is the entire series of reports published during May–July 1963
about a smallpox outbreak in Sweden. Selected tables and figures from these reports
also have been recreated to resemble the originals as closely as possible. A contem-
porary Editorial Note follows the outbreak reports.
[From the May 24, 1963, MMWR]
Smallpox — Continuedweden — Stockholm was declared a smallpox infected area on May 16. A seaman
who returned from Indonesia in late March is the apparent source of an outbreak
which has now spread through two generations of transmission and has resulted in
one fatality. Preliminary information on cases to date, received from the Ministry of
Health, Sweden, and forwarded by Dr. Reimert T. Ravenholt, Epidemiologic Consult-
ant, Division of Foreign Quarantine, U.S. Public Health Service, Paris, is given below:
The outbreak was recognized on May 13 when the diagnosis of smallpox was first
suspected in Case #7. The disease was sufficiently mild in Cases 1, 4, 5 and 12 that
medical assistance was not sought. The only fatality to date occurred in Case #2 who
apparently suffered an acute hemorrhagic form of the disease, diagnosed as smallpox
in retrospect.
This outbreak is of unique interest in that it represents one of the few epidemics in
Western nations in recent years not evidencing a predominant spread among hospital
contacts. Recent immunization programs among hospital personnel presumably have
altered the pattern of hospital spread observed in other recent outbreaks. The mild-
ness of the disease in several of the earlier cases, resulting in the failure of these pa-
tients to seek medical care and hospitalization, has contributed to the pattern of
community transmission.
The outbreak emphasizes the sinister role of mild or vaccine-modified cases of
smallpox in initiating and propagating outbreaks of severe disease. Since the outbreak
was discovered during the second generation of indigenous cases, it is possible that
Americans recently in Stockholm have been unknowingly exposed to the disease, and
cases of suspicious febrile illness in such individuals should receive the utmost scru-
tiny by clinicians and public health authorities.
[From the May 31, 1963, MMWR]
Four additional cases of smallpox have been identified in Stockholm with onsets of
illness since May 18. All four presumably acquired their disease as a result of hospital
contact.
The outbreak (See MMWR, Vol. 12, page 172) now totals 16 cases, with three gen-
erations of transmission following the importation of smallpox by a seaman who pre-
sumably acquired his disease in transit through Southeast Asia. Information on cases
to date received from Dr. Bo Zetterberg, Chief, Epidemiology Division, State Bacteriol-
ogy Laboratory, Stockholm, is summarized in the table below [See table, page 539].
The pattern of spread of the illness is presented diagrammatically in the accompa-
nying figure [See figure, page 540].
The first case to be identified occurred in an unvaccinated 19-year-old bricklayer
(Case 7) who had onset of fever, vomiting, and backache on May 5. He was hospital-
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ized three days later and subsequently developed an extensive maculo-papular rash
which became pustular by May 12. Smallpox was suspected and confirmed the fol-
lowing day by the laboratory.
Immediate epidemiologic investigation revealed that an aunt of the bricklayer
(Case 2) had developed on April 18 an acute febrile illness, manifest by hemorrhagic
skin lesions, and had died shortly after admission to the hospital on April 23. Ten other
cases of smallpox were identified May 14–16.
The original source of the outbreak was a 24-year-old seaman who after two weeks
residence in Australia left Darwin on March 22 on BOAC Flight #709. In-transit stops of
not more than 50 minutes each were made in Djakarta, Singapore, Rangoon, Calcutta,
Karachi, Teheran, and Damascus en route to Zurich. At Zurich, the seaman deplaned
and the following day boarded Swissair Flight #250, reaching Stockholm March 24. He
apparently acquired his disease as a result of in-transit exposure either at a terminal
or on the plane. On April 6, 15 days after the flight, he developed a moderate fever and
mild rash and remained in the home of his grandmother (Case 3) throughout his ill-
ness. Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5 all had contact with him in the grandmother’s home during
the course of his illness. On April 21, the grandmother fell ill, subsequently exposing
three women (Cases 8–10) who visited the home to provide nursing care to the elderly
woman prior to her hospitalization on May 27. She was originally diagnosed as having
chickenpox and recovered uneventfully. Another resident of the building (Case 11)
who lived two stories above the grandmother, developed smallpox but denied ac-
quaintance or contact with the grandmother.






1 24 M April 6 Southeast
Asia
1959 Modified illness
2 58 F April 18 Case #1 Childhood Died April 23
3 80 F April 21 Case #1 Childhood
4 24 F April 25 Case #1 1943 Modified illness
5 20 F Not known Case #1 1950 No rash (Lab diagnosis)
6 53 M May 3 Case #2 1920 Husband of Case #1
7 19 M May 5 Case #2 Never Died May 28
8 50 F May 5 Case #3 Childhood Home Nurse of Case #3
9 55 F May 5 Case #3 1916 Home Nurse of Case #3
10 67 F May 6 or 9 Case #3 1918
11 72 F May 8 Case #3 1915 No known direct contact
12 22 M May 11 Case #4 1961 Laboratory diagnosis only
13 61 M May 18 Case #3 or 6 1949** Hospital acquired
14 11⁄2 F May 19 ? Case #6 Never** Hospital acquired
15 72 F May 24 Case #9 Childhood Hospital acquired–
Died May 27
16 75 F ? May 24 Case #9 Childhood Hospital acquired
 *First identified case.




Summary of Current Information on Cases
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Case 2, the first fatality, apparently acquired the illness from the seaman during a
visit to the grandmother’s apartment and subsequently transmitted it to her husband
(Case 6) and her nephew (Case 7) the first identified case. Case 12 who had only fever
and serologic evidence of infection, acquired his disease presumably from his fiancee,
Case 4.
The appearance of cases among hospital contacts is more consistent with the pre-
viously observed patterns of imported smallpox in Western countries. Case 13 is a
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SMALLPOX - STOCKHOLM - 1963
DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE OUTBREAK
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gardener at the Infectious Disease Hospital where Cases 3 and 6 were admitted as
presumptive chickenpox on April 27 and May 7, respectively. He is thought to have
handled laundry from these patients prior to the first suspicion of smallpox on May 12.
He was initially employed by the hospital only two months previous and had not yet
been vaccinated in the hospital’s annual revaccination program.
Case 14 was a patient admitted to the Infectious Disease Hospital with whooping
cough on April 30. She was located in the same hospital vicinity as Case 6, although
there was no connection between the rooms housing these patients. Cases 15 and 16
were patients on the same hospital ward to which Case 9 was admitted on May 9.
Case 9 was originally thought to have a toxic drug eruption prior to her diagnosis of
smallpox on May 15.
With the exception of Case 12 who had an exceptionally mild illness, it is apparent
that spread of the disease to date has been primarily among individuals vaccinated at
times far distant in the past. Of the three fatalities to date, one occurred in a person
never vaccinated and the other two in persons vaccinated more than 50 years prior to
exposure. The absence of additional spread to hospital personnel is probably related
to efforts in Sweden to emphasize revaccination of hospital personnel at frequent in-
tervals. Notably, the last four cases have occurred in persons already identified and
isolated by virtue of being known contacts.
Some 8,000 persons living in neighborhoods of the earlier cases have been vacci-
nated. In addition, vaccination has been provided for other residents of Stockholm on
request and to date some 300,000 persons have availed themselves of this protection.
[From the June 7, 1963, MMWR]
Three additional cases, two hospital acquired, were identified last week bringing to
19 the total number of smallpox cases comprising the current outbreak, according to
information made available by Dr. Bo Zetterberg, Chief, Epidemiology Division, State
Bacteriology Laboratory, Stockholm.
Two of the three cases are actually part of the second generation of transmission
(See MMWR Vol. 12, pg. 174), having now been identified retrospectively by serologic
means. Neither patient developed a rash. Both were nurses in the Stockholm Infec-
tious Disease Hospital in close contact with the smallpox cases admitted there. The
first, a 44-year-old female, cared for Case No. 3 from April 27 to May 7 daily, including
bathing and local treatment of the lesions. On May 9, the nurse developed fever and
headache, as well as nausea and low back pain. Except for May 13 and 14, she contin-
ued to work throughout her illness until isolated on May 18. She was found to have a
very high hemagglutination inhibition antibody titer suggesting recent infection. Her
last vaccination prior to onset of illness was in 1962. She was also in daily contact with
Cases 6 and 14, and directly or indirectly may have transmitted the disease to Case 14.
The second nurse, a 22-year-old female, also employed in the Stockholm Infectious
Disease Hospital, had daily contact with Case No. 2 during the period April 27–May 7.
On May 11, she experienced onset of headache, fever, and sore throat and was absent
from work May 11 through May 13. No rash developed. A high HAI titer verified the
diagnosis of smallpox. She had previously been vaccinated in 1950 but at the time of
exposure had not yet been revaccinated under the hospital’s annual revaccination pro-
gram.
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The final additional case is that of a 47-year-old man who had onset of illness
May 21 while already isolated as a contact. He is the father of Case 7, the first identi-
fied case. He had never been vaccinated until 7 days before onset of illness.
The total number of hospital-acquired cases now stands at 6, one-third of the sec-
ondary indigenous cases. The evidence supports close contact as the primary requisi-
te for spread both in the hospital and in the community. The disease has spread
among persons vaccinated more than 7 years prior to the time of their exposure with
2 notable exceptions, both patients with mild disease without rash. The table below
presents data on the vaccination status of the 18 indigenous cases [See table below].
[From the June 14, 1963, MMWR]
Two additional cases of smallpox were identified in Stockholm last week bringing
to 21 the total number of cases in the current outbreak. Unique circumstances involv-
ing these two persons, neither of whom were under surveillance as contacts at the
time of their detection, indicates that the outbreak may perhaps be expected to con-
tinue.
Information made available by Dr. Bo Zetterberg, Chief, Epidemiology Division,
State Bacteriology Laboratory, Stockholm, indicates that on June 6 an 85-year-old
woman, who lives with her daughter, went to a hospital out-patient department for
routine follow-up of a chronic medical problem. The daughter called in advance in-
forming clinic personnel that the elderly woman had developed a rash. On arrival at
the out-patient clinic, the mother spent some time in the general waiting room and
was then referred to the dermatology clinic, and again spent some time in the derma-
tology waiting room. When seen by physicians, a clinical diagnosis of smallpox was
made. In all, she had spent some four hours at the hospital and presumably exposed
some 450 persons in the two crowded waiting rooms. It was noted that on May 28 she
had developed a low-grade fever with dizziness, followed by the appearance of rash
on June 2.
She and her 54-year-old daughter share an apartment in a boarding house for
women housing some 100 occupants. The daughter works as a mortician and on
April 26 had prepared the body of smallpox Case 2 of the outbreak for cremation. She
had been placed under surveillance as a contact and 16 days after her exposure to the
dead woman, having had no symptoms or signs of illness, she was released from
quarantine. She denied any evidence of illness since being released from surveillance.
The total elapsed time from her contact with the body of Case 2 and the onset of
disease in her mother was 32 days, consistent with two incubation periods of small-
pox. Except for the daughter’s exposure, no epidemiologic evidence could be found
linking the mother with a source of smallpox. Neither the mother nor daughter had





Rash No Rash Deaths
 7 yrs. or less 2 – 2 –
 8–14 yrs. 3 1 2 –
15–24 yrs. 2 2 – –
25–50 yrs. 4 3 1 –
More than 50 years 4 4 – 2
Never 3 3 – 1
 Totals 18 13 5 3
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been vaccinated since childhood. The daughter demonstrated a high HAI titer on
June 6, suggesting a recent infection, and in the absence of an alternative explanation,
it may be presumed that the daughter developed a sub-clinical infection and transmit-
ted virus to her mother. Two very unusual aspects of smallpox transmission seem
apparent. The daughter, unvaccinated since childhood and exposed to hemorrhagic
smallpox, developed an infection so mild as to produce no symptoms, yet developed
serologic evidence of infection. Despite the presumed absence of any rash or systemic
manifestations of disease, she was apparently able to transmit the illness to her
mother.
The inadvertent exposure of the mother during her eruptive stage to some 450 per-
sons at the hospital, as well as possible contacts in the boarding house, establishes an
additional large group of contacts in which cases may yet occur.
An epidemic curve for the outbreak to date is presented showing the chronologic
relationship of the generations of transmission [See Figure below]. Using the median
date in the span of onset dates for each generation, it is apparent that the median
incubation periods for all generations are strikingly similar.
[From the July 3, 1963, MMWR]
No new cases have been reported during the past week. The total number of con-
firmed cases remains at 23, including four deaths. The fourth death reported involved
an unvaccinated 47-year-old male who died on June 15, 25 days after onset of illness.
He was the father of case 7, also a fatality (See MMWR, Vol. 12, No. 21, pp. 174 and
183).
[From the July 19, 1963, MMWR]
Two additional cases of smallpox were reported from Stockholm on July 11 and
July 12, respectively. One of these, an 89-year-old female patient in a mental hospital,
had onset of rash and fever on July 7, 15 days after onset of illness in Case 23, a
73-year-old woman also hospitalized at this institution.
The total number of confirmed cases that has occurred during the outbreak is 25,
including four deaths.
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Editorial Note—1996: Reading this MMWR  account of the outbreak of imported
smallpox in Sweden during April–July 1963 is as haunting now as it was frightening
then. At the time, there was justifiable concern about possible spread of infection from
Sweden to the United States, and when residents of Stockholm were offered vaccina-
tion during the outbreak, “some 300,000 persons...availed themselves of this protec-
tion.”
Sweden was the first major country to eliminate indigenous smallpox, a distinction
it achieved in 1895 (1 ). This outbreak was the first appearance of imported smallpox
there since 1932, except for a single case in 1945 (2 ). Infecting 25 persons over six
indigenous generations of transmission, this was one of the larger such outbreaks in
Europe (which had two other imported outbreaks in 1963, four in 1962, and 10 in 1961,
for example) after 1958 (3 ). Despite Sweden’s active vaccination efforts among hospi-
tal personnel, eight of the indigenous cases were acquired by hospital staff or pa-
tients; most of the remainder were infected by face-to-face contact in the homes of
case-patients. However, the versatile virus apparently also spread in this one outbreak
from a corpse, from laundry of another case-patient, and by remote airborne expo-
sure, and its clinical presentation ranged from six cases (among persons with old vac-
cinations) who did not develop a rash at all to at least one hemorrhagic case.
Several aspects of the outbreak in Sweden differed dramatically from smallpox
outbreaks in Great Britain the previous winter following importations from Pakistan. In
particular, this outbreak was not recognized until seven cases already had occurred;
ambulatory cases with “mild” disease were important in early transmission; the over-
all case-fatality rate was substantially lower (15% in Sweden versus 40% in Great Brit-
ain). At the time, these differences were attributed to vaccine-modification of
smallpox associated with the ameliorating influence of partial immunity from distant
prior vaccinations. In retrospect, they may reflect infection with a strain of smallpox
virus from Indonesia where smallpox historically seemed to be less lethal than on the
Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.
In the outbreak in Sweden, hospital transmission of smallpox was not prominent in
the early generations of disease as it was in most other European outbreaks associ-
ated with importation. However, once patients began to be admitted to the hospital,
the hospital became the focus of transmission. In addition, transmission also was as-
sociated with contact with fatal cases; indeed, handling smallpox corpses and attend-
ing funerals of smallpox victims resulted in outbreaks in Africa and other
smallpox-endemic areas during the global smallpox eradication campaign (4 ).
Dr. Ronald R. Roberto, an officer in CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service Program
during 1962–1964, went to Stockholm as an international observer during this out-
break. In addition to his role in rapidly communicating emerging information to CDC,
he formed relationships with Swedish colleagues—including epidemiologists H. B.
Lundbeck and B. O. Ringertz and virologist J. A. Espmark—who made important con-
tributions to the subsequent development of smallpox eradication activities of CDC
and the World Health Organization.
This outbreak also highlights how interconnected the world was already in 1963,
and it illustrates vividly the potential danger posed to all other humans as long as
smallpox existed anywhere on the planet. Even discounting the unknown, apparently
chance encounter by which the index patient in this outbreak came to be infected, the
capricious nature of many of the subsequent encounters that resulted in indigenous
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cases in Sweden is breathtaking. The painful lesson was not lost on Sweden, which
contributed almost $16 million to the global Smallpox Eradication Program, beginning
in 1967, making it the second largest donor after the United States (3 ). Sweden’s gen-
erosity was especially important during the final battles against smallpox in India,
Bangladesh, and Somalia.
Finally, it is fitting that CDC marks the 50th Anniversary of its own founding by
commemorating the 200 years since Edward Jenner discovered vaccination in May
1796 and the 30 years since the Nineteenth World Health Assembly resolved in May
1966 to eradicate smallpox over the next 10 years. The CDC effort in helping 20 West
and Central African countries to eradicate smallpox early in the global campaign with
support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development and by the Public
Health Service remains one of its finest and most beneficial achievements.
The glorious legacy of the global Smallpox Eradication Program lives today in the
campaigns to eradicate dracunculiasis and poliomyelitis. Others too will follow.
Editorial Note by: Donald R. Hopkins, M.D., M.P.H., Carter Center/Global 2000, Atlanta, and
Emeritus Deputy Director, CDC. J. Donald Millar, M.D., D.T.P.H. (Lond.), President, Don Millar &
Associates, Inc., Atlanta, and Emeritus Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Center for Environmental Health, Bureau of State Services, and Smallpox Eradication
Program, CDC.
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Epidemiological Notes and Reports
Pentachlorophenol Poisoning in Newborn Infants —
St. Louis, Missouri, April–August 1967
Reprinted below is the text and editorial note of a report published in the October
7, 1967, MMWR. A contemporary Editorial Note follows.
Pentachlorophenol Poisoning — ContinuedFrom April to August 1967, ine cases of a clinically distinct illness characterized by
fever and profuse sweating occurred in a small nursery for newborns in St. Louis,
Missouri. Two of the cases were fatal. Early in the course of the outbreak the disease
was felt to be an intoxication, but the nature of the poison and the mode of exposure
of the patients remained obscure. Only after the ninth case developed was it discov-
ered that an antimildew agent, containing a high concentration of sodium pentachlo-
rophenate (the sodium salt of pentachlorophenol), was being used in the hospital
laundry. All of the clinical, epidemiological, and biochemical evidence indicated that
this outbreak resulted from pentachlorophenol poisoning. The only identified mode of
exposure was skin absorption of sodium pentachlorophenate residues on diapers and
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other fabrics, resulting from the misuse of the antimildew agent in the final laundry
rinse.
The outstanding clinical feature of the illness was extreme diaphoresis. Attendants
consistently noticed that the infants’ clothing and brows were drenched with sweat.
Nevertheless, the neonates nursed avidly. As the disease progressed, fever rose as
high as 103 F, respiratory rates increased, and breathing became labored, though aus-
cultation of the lungs was normal and cyanosis was absent. Other common findings
included tachycardia, hepatomegaly, and irritability followed by lethargy. Anorexia,
vomiting, and diarrhea were notably absent. Stiffness of the neck, muscular fascicula-
tions, and convulsions were not observed. Skin rashes or evidences of inflammation
or irritation of the skin were not seen.  
Laboratory tests frequently showed a progressive metabolic acidosis, proteinuria,
a rising blood urea nitrogen, and “pneumonia” or “bronchiolitis” on X-ray. Bacterial
and viral cultures of blood, cerebrospinal fluid, nose, throat and stool revealed no
pathogens. Autopsy findings of the two fatal cases showed fatty metamorphosis of
the liver in both cases and fatty vacuolar changes in the renal tubules of one case.
All except one of the seriously ill infants, a fatal case, were transferred to other
hospitals for treatment. After the first fatal case occurred, the attending physicians
suspected a toxic cause and therefore promptly performed exchange transfusions on
each of the seriously ill infants who were subsequently transferred for medical care.
This treatment yielded dramatic results. Within minutes to hours, the infants became
more responsive and had less respiratory distress. Fever and sweating disappeared,
as did metabolic acidosis. Renal function returned to normal during the next few days.
Except for the two fatal cases, recovery was apparently complete.
The first four cases developed between April 17 and 19 among a group of 25 infants
who were in the nursery during this interval. The first infant to become ill died. The
institution was closed on April 24 and thoroughly cleaned and disinfected before re-
opening on May 3. A second cluster of four cases occurred between May 10 and 15.
One of these also was fatal. The average age of these eight cases, at onset of illness,
was 8.9 days. Several additional suspect cases with fever and sweating were detected
among 13 infants who had been discharged from the hospital in apparent health be-
tween April 17 and May 15.
From the time of the first recognition of the outbreak, an intensive and persistent
search was made for toxic substances in the environment of the infants. A solid-stick
evaporating deodorizer had been used without change in practice for 4 years. A com-
mercial exterminator had sprayed regularly with a carbamate insecticide monthly for
2 years within the hospital, but never in the nursery. The management of drugs and
the preparation of babies’ formulas revealed no deviations that were likely to permit
the introduction of a toxic substance to this many babies.  
For the preceding 10 months, a commercially available disinfectant containing a
mixture of synthetic phenolic derivatives had been repeatedly applied to surfaces that
came in contact with infants’ skin.
One-dimensional thin-layer chromatography of serum specimens obtained from
the first eight cases was performed. These tests revealed the presence of a phenolic
substance in all test specimens, which was similar to a phenolic ingredient of the dis-
infectant. This substance was thought to be the toxic chemical causing the disease.
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The nursery was closed and recleaned. Use of the suspect disinfectant was aban-
doned, and all equipment that had been treated with it was discarded or rendered free
of phenolic residues by extensive cleaning with alcohol. New linens and diapers were
purchased and the nursery reopened July 11.
On August 29, an 8-day-old infant had the acute onset of an illness identical to the
previous eight infants. The infant received an exchange transfusion and promptly re-
covered. A follow-up survey of infants discharged from the hospital in July and Au-
gust revealed six additional infants who had the characteristic excessive sweating in a
milder form of the same syndrome.
The formerly suspect disinfectant was no longer in use. Reinvestigation of laundry
procedures disclosed a previously overlooked source of phenols. An antimildew
agent, containing 22.9 percent sodium pentachlorophenate and 4.0 percent trichloro-
carbanilide, was being used in the terminal rinse of all nursery linens and diapers,
despite a warning on the label that the compound “must not be used” in laundering
diapers.
This product had been in use in the laundry since March 1966. The recommended
quantity was one ounce of powder per laundering cycle, but it was ascertained that
the laundry was actually using 3 to 4 ounces.
Thin-layer chromatography of the serum and urine of the new case revealed an
abnormal substance with characteristics that were identical to those detected in the
previous infants’ sera. Further studies in two different laboratories with improved
methods of analysis have shown that the chemical in the urine and serum of the new
case was pentachlorophenol, and was clearly not one of the phenolic ingredients in
the previously suspected disinfectant. Additionally, pentachlorophenol was identified
in freshly laundered diapers obtained from the nursery. The quantity of pentachloro-
phenol varied from 1.5 to 5.7 mg. per diaper. Pentachlorophenol, when fed to rats, was
found to be highly toxic and was isolated from urine of surviving rats in concentra-
tions comparable to that found in the sick child. Unfortunately, no samples from the
earlier cases remained for these more sophisticated analyses.
Actions have been instituted to prevent further illnesses that might be caused by
the misuse of this product, or two other sodium pentachlorophenate-containing prod-
ucts that are recommended for similar purposes. The manufacturer has been directed
to trace all sales and shipments of these products during the past 18 months, and to
remove such products from all hospitals and any establishment that is involved in
general laundry work. The company has voluntarily ceased sale of these three prod-
ucts.
(Reported by J. Earl Smith, M.D., Health Commissioner, Division of Health, Department of Health
and Hospitals, City of St. Louis, Missouri; L.E. Loveless, Ph.D., Chemist, Clinical Laboratories,
St. Louis, Missouri; E. A. Belden, M.D., Consultant, Communicable Disease Control, Local Health
Services Section, Division of Health, Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare; the
Epidemiology and Pesticides Programs of the National Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta,
Georgia; the Toxicology Section, Occupational Health Program, National Center for Urban and
Industrial Health, Cincinnati, Ohio; and a team of EIS Officers.)
Editorial Note: The clinical, laboratory, epidemiological, and pathological findings, as
well as the prompt response to exchange transfusion, all indicate a toxic, rather than
an infectious, cause of this outbreak. The fever, sweating, and acidosis are consistent
with intoxication with certain phenolic derivatives, which are known to increase the
metabolic rate (1 ). The symptoms described here are remarkably similar to industrial
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accidental poisonings resulting from overexposure to pentachlorophenol or its so-
dium salts (2,3 ). The exact manner in which the infants became poisoned cannot be
established, but the most reasonable explanation is absorption through the intact skin
as a result of repeated contact with diapers, blankets, and linens containing small, but
readily absorbable, quantities of sodium pentachlorophenate. The antimildew agent,
which is labelled not for use in laundering diapers or hospital linens, nevertheless,
was in use in this hospital. Pediatricians, hospital administrators, housekeepers, and
local health authorities should check commercial diaper services and hospital laun-
dries to ensure that this product is not in use.   
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Editorial Note—1996: This report, one of the first well-documented accounts of an
investigation of a noninfectious disease problem to be published in MMWR after re-
sponsibility for the publication had been transferred to CDC, illustrates one of the
most difficult challenges facing environmental epidemiologists—exposure assess-
ment. Even in acute situations such as that described in this report, the search for a
toxic agent and the route of exposure is difficult and time consuming. In investigations
of chronic and many environmentally related illnesses, exposures that may have oc-
curred over an extended period may be particularly difficult to characterize accurately;
the paucity of accurate exposure data has been termed the “Achilles heel” of environ-
mental epidemiology (1 ). 
As illustrated by this investigation in St. Louis in 1967, the use of innovative labora-
tory methodologies has been critical to improving the accuracy of exposure assess-
ments. For example, during this investigation, epidemiologists initially relied on the
laboratory techniques of thin-layer chromotographic analysis of patient specimens to
identify a phenol as the probable etiologic agent; more advanced laboratory methods
were used to confirm the causative role of this agent and to further focus the investi-
gation. Since 1967, the close collaboration between epidemiologists and laboratory
scientists during environmental investigations has continued to strengthen, and the
development of biomarkers of exposure, disease, and susceptibility has been critical
in assisting public health scientists in exposure assessment (2 ). Environmental epide-
miologists in state and federal health agencies are addressing the difficulties of accu-
rately classifying exposure in other innovative ways. For example, computer mapping
techniques, such as Geographic Information Systems, have enabled investigators to
more accurately use environmental sampling data to represent individual exposure.
Finally, although the investigation in St. Louis was highly focused, the approach to this
outbreak underscored the public health benefits of basic “shoe leather epidemiology”
for solving problems regardless of their etiology.
Editorial Note by: Health Studies Branch, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects,
National Center for Environmental Health, CDC.
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Outbreaks of Cyclospora cayetanensis  Infection — 
United States, 1996
Cyclospora cayetanensis  (previously termed cyanobacterium-like body) is a re-
cently characterized coccidian parasite (1 ); the first known cases of infection in hu-
mans were diagnosed in 1977 (2 ). Before 1996, only three outbreaks of Cyclospora 
infection had been reported in the United States (3–5 ). This report describes the pre-
liminary findings of an ongoing outbreak investigation by the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) and summarizes the findings
from investigations in other states.
South Carolina
On June 14, the SCDHEC was notified of diarrheal illness among persons who at-
tended a luncheon near Charleston on May 23. A case of Cyclospora  infection was
defined as diarrhea (three or more loose stools per day or two or more stools per day
if using antimotility drugs) after attending the luncheon. All 64 attendees were inter-
viewed. Of the 64 persons, 37 (58%) had Cyclospora  infection, including seven with
laboratory-confirmed infection. The median incubation period was 7.5 days (range:
1–23 days).
Based on univariate analysis by the SCDHEC, food items associated with illness
included raspberries (RR=5.6; 95% CI=2.3–13.7), strawberries (RR=2.2; 95% CI=1.0–
5.1), and potato salad (RR=1.9; 95% CI=1.3–2.7). On May 23, a total of 95 persons at-
tended a luncheon in an adjacent room and were served strawberries obtained from
the same source but were not served raspberries; no cases were identified among
these persons. One person who ate raspberries at the establishment that evening de-
veloped laboratory-confirmed infection; she had not attended either luncheon or
eaten strawberries.
Other investigations
In May and June 1996, social event-related clusters of cases and/or sporadic cases
of Cyclospora infection were reported in at least 10 states and in Ontario, Canada.
Several hundred laboratory-confirmed cases have been reported to CDC. Most cases
have occurred in immunocompetent adults.
Preliminary evidence suggests that, in these outbreaks, consumption of fresh
fruit—raspberries and mixtures of berries and other fruits (precluding determination
of which fruit in the mixture was associated with illness)—may be associated with
Cyclospora  infection. CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and health offi-
cials in state and local health departments and Canada are collaborating to determine
the extent and causes of the outbreaks, the sources of contamination, and whether
transmission is ongoing. Additional efforts include the use of the five-site CDC/U.S.
Department of Agriculture/FDA active foodborne diseases surveillance network (es-
tablished in 1995; collaborating sites include Atlanta and portions of California, Con-
necticut, Minnesota, and Oregon). Although standardized methods are not yet
available, FDA, CDC, and others are testing samples of produce for Cyclospora.
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Reported by: J Chambers, MD, S Somerfeldt, MS, L Mackey, S Nichols, MS, Trident Health
District; R Ball, MD, D Roberts, MPH, N Dufford, MS, A Reddick, PhD, J Gibson, MD, State
Epidemiologist, South Carolina Dept of Health and Environmental Control. Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, and Office of Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug Administration.
Div of Field Epidemiology, Epidemiology Program Office; Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Br,
Div of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, and Epidemiology Br, Div of Parasitic Diseases, National
Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC.
Editorial Note: Although Cyclospora  is transmitted by the fecal-oral route, direct
person-to-person transmission is unlikely because excreted oocysts require days to
weeks under favorable environmental conditions to become infectious (i.e., sporu-
late). Whether animals serve as sources of infection for humans is unknown. Most
reported cases have occurred during spring and summer. The average incubation pe-
riod is 1 week, and illness may be protracted (from days to weeks) with frequent, wa-
tery stools and other gastrointestinal symptoms; symptoms may remit and relapse.
The diameter of Cyclospora  oocysts is 8–10 µm, approximately twice that of Cryp-
tosporidium parvum. Oocysts can be identified in stool by examination of wet mounts
under phase microscopy, use of modified acid-fast stains (oocysts are variably acid-
fast), or demonstration of autofluorescence with ultraviolet epifluorescence micros-
copy. However, these procedures are not routine for most clinical laboratories, and
confirmation of the diagnosis by an experienced reference laboratory is recom-
mended. Demonstration of sporulation provides definitive evidence for the diagnosis
(1 ). Infection with Cyclospora  can be treated with a 7-day course of oral trimethoprim
(TMP)-sulfamethoxazole (SMX) (for adults, TMP 160 mg plus SMX 800 mg twice daily;
for children, TMP 5 mg/kg plus SMX 25 mg/kg twice daily) (6 ). Treatment regimens for
patients who cannot tolerate sulfa drugs have not yet been identified.
The preliminary findings of these investigations suggest that consumption of some
fresh fruits has been associated with increased risk for illness. However, the investiga-
tions have not yet determined specific sources or modes of contamination. Potential
sources of infection include seasonal produce that orginates from different domestic
and international locations at different times of the year; the complex distribution
routes and handling of these foods complicate tracebacks and other key aspects of the
investgations. As always, produce to be eaten raw should be thoroughly washed. This
practice may not entirely eliminate the risk of transmission of Cyclospora. Health-care
providers should consider Cyclospora  infection in persons with prolonged diarrheal
illness and specifically request laboratory testing for this parasite; cases should be
reported to local and state health departments. Health departments that identify cases
of Cyclospora  infection should contact CDC’s Division of Parasitic Diseases, National
Center for Infectious Diseases, telephone (770) 488-7760.
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FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, comparison of 4-week totals ending
June 22, 1996, with historical data — United States
Anthrax - HIV infection, pediatric*§ 122
Brucellosis 39 Plague -
Cholera 2 Poliomyelitis, paralytic¶ -
Congenital rubella syndrome 1 Psittacosis 16
Cryptosporidiosis* 743 Rabies, human -
Diphtheria 1 Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) 147
Encephalitis: California* - Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome* 10
eastern equine* 1 Syphilis, congenital** -
St. Louis* - Tetanus 10
western equine* - Toxic-shock syndrome 63
Hansen Disease 47 Trichinosis 11
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome*† 6 Typhoid fever 154
Cum. 1996Cum. 1996
TABLE I. Summary — cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,
cumulative, week ending June 22, 1996 (25th Week)
 -: no reported cases
 *Not notifiable in all states.
† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID).
§ Updated monthly to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP), last
update May 28, 1996.
¶ One suspected case of polio with onset in 1996 has been reported to date.















































*Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and
subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is
based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.
Vol. 45 / No. 25 MMWR 553
TABLE II. Cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending
June 22, 1996, and June 24, 1995 (25th Week)
UNITED STATES 28,480 34,140 142,684 544 220 132,142 184,854 1,754 1,915 336 553
NEW ENGLAND 1,123 1,717 8,288 64 18 3,549 2,366 55 59 18 10
Maine 16 26 - 3 - 21 36 - - 1 3
N.H. 31 53 353 4 2 70 59 3 9 - 1
Vt. 9 14 - 6 6 28 20 23 6 2 -
Mass. 550 793 3,203 25 10 1,038 1,416 26 43 9 5
R.I. 73 134 973 5 - 249 245 3 1 6 1
Conn. 444 697 3,759 21 - 2,143 590 - - N N
MID. ATLANTIC 7,891 8,567 19,494 53 23 14,612 21,369 176 197 68 72
Upstate N.Y. 1,000 1,117 N 35 12 2,948 4,204 151 100 20 22
N.Y. City 4,489 4,478 8,875 - - 4,635 8,678 1 1 - 1
N.J. 1,511 1,777 2,053 18 5 2,328 1,702 - 82 7 14
Pa. 891 1,195 8,566 N 6 4,701 6,785 24 14 41 35
E.N. CENTRAL 2,298 2,871 27,126 146 70 25,804 38,056 222 158 99 180
Ohio 521 608 14,147 45 19 9,659 11,954 7 5 44 81
Ind. 347 256 4,949 23 11 3,369 4,390 7 - 25 42
Ill. 974 1,273 - 52 16 8,017 9,732 28 48 2 18
Mich. 323 562 4,101 26 24 2,911 8,820 180 105 22 19
Wis. 133 172 3,929 N - 1,848 3,160 - - 6 20
W.N. CENTRAL 691 784 11,764 93 45 5,658 9,636 127 31 24 41
Minn. 126 149 - 23 18 U 1,410 - 2 1 -
Iowa 51 44 1,878 17 11 481 697 97 3 5 12
Mo. 327 340 6,185 15 - 3,837 5,605 18 11 6 12
N. Dak. 6 4 2 7 6 1 15 - 3 - 2
S. Dak. 7 9 676 3 - 95 89 - 1 2 -
Nebr. 49 62 869 8 2 158 462 3 8 8 11
Kans. 125 176 2,154 20 8 1,086 1,358 9 3 2 4
S. ATLANTIC 7,305 8,716 24,737 31 5 46,386 51,917 117 135 51 93
Del. 142 163 - - 1 691 961 1 - - -
Md. 853 1,295 2,978 N 1 5,952 6,145 - 6 7 16
D.C. 452 545 N - - 2,097 2,240 - - 3 3
Va. 396 558 5,330 N 1 4,515 5,360 7 5 12 7
W. Va. 49 42 - N - 224 373 7 25 1 3
N.C. 355 491 - 7 2 9,073 11,665 22 27 3 18
S.C. 387 451 - 4 - 5,368 5,843 15 11 4 18
Ga. 1,096 1,093 5,910 7 - 10,226 9,563 - 15 1 11
Fla. 3,575 4,078 10,519 11 - 8,240 9,767 65 46 20 17
E.S. CENTRAL 953 1,032 14,260 18 13 14,951 18,834 341 585 26 25
Ky. 153 119 3,196 2 1 1,957 2,174 15 18 3 5
Tenn. 352 435 6,237 8 12 5,312 6,379 281 565 10 8
Ala. 278 261 4,060 4 - 6,317 7,804 2 2 2 4
Miss. 170 217 U 4 - 1,365 2,477 43 - 11 8
W.S. CENTRAL 2,656 2,968 6,210 25 4 8,706 24,912 207 118 2 11
Ark. 121 136 - 6 2 1,380 2,373 2 2 - 4
La. 656 360 3,318 4 2 3,710 5,724 86 77 - 2
Okla. 96 155 2,892 2 - 1,788 2,362 61 24 2 3
Tex. 1,783 2,317 - 13 - 1,828 14,453 58 15 - 2
MOUNTAIN 811 1,120 4,834 47 18 3,496 4,393 302 240 20 66
Mont. 10 9 - 4 - 13 38 10 9 1 4
Idaho 19 26 759 13 4 51 62 80 32 - 1
Wyo. 2 7 319 - 2 13 24 93 105 2 6
Colo. 248 373 - 17 5 886 1,451 27 33 6 26
N. Mex. 45 107 - 2 - 428 496 35 30 1 4
Ariz. 240 298 2,684 N 7 1,833 1,545 38 15 7 6
Utah 90 69 254 8 - 49 111 12 7 1 6
Nev. 157 231 818 3 - 223 666 7 9 2 13
PACIFIC 4,752 6,365 25,971 67 24 8,980 13,371 207 392 28 55
Wash. 366 458 4,557 16 5 1,006 1,187 32 108 1 7
Oreg. 223 208 2,711 21 14 259 202 4 24 - -
Calif. 4,074 5,512 17,607 28 - 7,329 11,340 70 250 27 43
Alaska 11 46 494 2 - 218 341 2 1 - -
Hawaii 78 141 602 N 5 168 301 99 9 - 5
Guam 3 - 114 N - 26 60 1 4 - 1
P.R. 426 1,491 N 13 U 149 286 64 93 - -
V.I. 9 21 N N U - 21 - - - -
Amer. Samoa - - - N U - 8 - - - -
C.N.M.I. - - N N U 11 13 - - - -
N: Not notifiable U: Unavailable -: no reported cases C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands
*Updated monthly to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, last update May 28, 1996.
†National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance.
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TABLE II. (Cont’d.) Cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending
June 22, 1996, and June 24, 1995 (25th Week)
UNITED STATES 1,896 2,698 492 491 1,823 1,714 5,374 7,658 7,761 8,711 2,573 3,539
NEW ENGLAND 312 344 24 19 72 83 73 95 183 199 294 812
Maine 3 3 3 1 11 6 - 2 4 - - -
N.H. 5 14 1 1 3 16 1 1 6 5 39 93
Vt. 1 5 2 - 3 6 - - 1 2 83 110
Mass. 42 24 7 6 28 28 34 37 77 113 53 288
R.I. 43 60 3 2 - - 1 1 21 18 25 137
Conn. 218 238 8 9 27 27 37 54 74 61 94 184
MID. ATLANTIC 1,342 1,875 114 125 149 218 209 418 1,348 1,962 407 1,025
Upstate N.Y. 703 1,007 31 24 50 65 36 38 142 203 237 591
N.Y. City 159 172 50 58 22 28 68 187 751 1,135 - -
N.J. 86 240 28 31 37 57 55 87 310 327 67 183
Pa. 394 456 5 12 40 68 50 106 145 297 103 251
E.N. CENTRAL 23 105 42 71 227 258 959 1,276 838 742 23 20
Ohio 18 10 7 4 90 70 478 430 142 138 4 2
Ind. 5 7 7 9 37 36 120 150 91 71 1 3
Ill. - 7 8 41 48 73 238 471 518 503 2 3
Mich. - 1 13 9 28 47 41 130 37 U 8 11
Wis. U 80 7 8 24 32 82 95 50 30 8 1
W.N. CENTRAL 49 39 12 10 141 96 192 407 206 287 259 173
Minn. 3 - 3 3 15 16 27 26 38 66 14 11
Iowa 19 1 2 1 32 16 11 27 31 38 129 54
Mo. 7 18 5 4 63 37 144 338 86 108 13 18
N. Dak. - - - - 2 1 - - 2 1 28 17
S. Dak. - - - - 3 4 - - 13 10 59 47
Nebr. - 4 - 2 10 8 6 7 13 17 3 1
Kans. 20 16 2 - 16 14 4 9 23 47 13 25
S. ATLANTIC 86 230 113 99 413 280 1,844 2,030 1,297 1,377 1,247 1,062
Del. 7 23 2 1 2 3 18 8 20 25 38 60
Md. 38 145 22 24 36 23 284 201 139 194 299 213
D.C. 1 1 5 9 7 2 87 60 70 51 2 10
Va. 4 16 15 21 33 33 223 314 118 136 263 199
W. Va. 4 12 1 1 10 5 1 2 27 47 52 52
N.C. 20 20 10 8 48 49 517 564 217 180 327 213
S.C. 2 7 3 - 38 35 213 314 40 159 38 67
Ga. - 4 8 10 92 57 324 373 332 16 140 143
Fla. 10 2 47 25 147 73 177 194 334 569 88 105
E.S. CENTRAL 29 19 12 10 107 109 1,273 1,507 658 645 91 129
Ky. 10 3 2 - 19 29 67 99 115 149 24 9
Tenn. 8 9 5 4 10 33 478 411 197 210 30 51
Ala. 1 1 2 5 39 25 266 302 223 185 35 66
Miss. 10 6 3 1 39 22 462 695 123 101 2 3
W.S. CENTRAL 18 46 11 8 210 195 566 1,539 877 1,104 31 70
Ark. 9 3 - 1 27 22 141 237 45 104 9 27
La. - - 1 1 35 30 283 524 U 106 12 22
Okla. 2 19 - - 20 22 68 83 34 - 10 21
Tex. 7 24 10 6 128 121 74 695 798 894 - -
MOUNTAIN 2 2 29 30 114 131 60 122 261 301 54 62
Mont. - - 3 2 4 2 - 3 7 3 9 23
Idaho - - - 1 16 5 1 - 4 6 - -
Wyo. 2 1 2 - 3 5 2 - 3 1 14 19
Colo. - - 14 16 20 35 19 70 43 25 10 -
N. Mex. - - 1 3 20 26 - 4 43 42 1 3
Ariz. - - 3 5 31 42 35 20 107 147 15 15
Utah - - 4 2 11 8 - 4 18 19 2 1
Nev. - 1 2 1 9 8 3 21 36 58 3 1
PACIFIC 35 38 135 119 390 344 198 264 2,093 2,094 167 186
Wash. 1 2 8 11 56 57 3 7 114 134 - 3
Oreg. 7 3 11 7 71 61 5 6 47 23 - -
Calif. 26 33 110 93 257 219 190 250 1,816 1,811 159 176
Alaska - - 2 1 4 5 - 1 33 42 8 7
Hawaii 1 - 4 7 2 2 - - 83 84 - -
Guam - - - 1 1 2 3 3 35 59 - -
P.R. - - - 1 3 13 73 147 58 85 28 27
V.I. - - - - - - - 1 - - - -
Amer. Samoa - - - - - - - - - 3 - -
C.N.M.I. - - - 1 - - 1 3 - 13 - -
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TABLE III. Cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination,
United States, weeks ending June 22, 1996, and June 24, 1995 (25th Week)
UNITED STATES 608 640 12,681 12,609 4,322 4,735 32 238 - 19
NEW ENGLAND 13 34 152 116 89 110 1 7 - 2
Maine 2 3 12 16 2 6 - - - -
N.H. 7 7 6 5 6 12 - - - -
Vt. - 1 3 3 4 2 - 1 - -
Mass. 4 7 78 45 24 37 1 5 - 2
R.I. - - 6 14 6 8 - - - -
Conn. - 16 47 33 47 45 - 1 - -
MID. ATLANTIC 92 75 718 825 617 664 - 12 - 5
Upstate N.Y. 30 20 196 189 175 164 - - - -
N.Y. City 14 19 302 409 287 222 - 4 - 3
N.J. 31 11 133 107 99 166 U - U -
Pa. 17 25 87 120 56 112 - 8 - 2
E.N. CENTRAL 84 112 1,054 1,643 452 533 - 6 - 3
Ohio 51 53 457 941 60 62 - 2 - -
Ind. 7 15 158 77 80 105 - - - -
Ill. 16 27 185 320 89 143 - 2 - 1
Mich. 5 15 182 185 196 189 - 1 - 2
Wis. 5 2 72 120 27 34 - 1 - -
W.N. CENTRAL 25 35 1,006 807 240 297 - 16 - 1
Minn. 10 14 50 88 19 26 U 13 U 1
Iowa 7 2 218 38 80 21 - - - -
Mo. 5 14 467 579 110 213 - 2 - -
N. Dak. - - 27 13 - 3 - - - -
S. Dak. 1 - 37 18 - 2 - - - -
Nebr. 1 3 113 21 8 15 - - - -
Kans. 1 2 94 50 23 17 - 1 - -
S. ATLANTIC 146 158 578 546 684 659 - 3 - 2
Del. 1 - 6 7 2 4 - 1 - -
Md. 35 46 102 92 152 132 - 2 - -
D.C. 5 - 15 9 15 12 - - - -
Va. 4 18 78 93 69 46 - - - 2
W. Va. 4 6 11 11 14 29 - - - -
N.C. 17 20 60 58 177 153 - - - -
S.C. 3 - 30 19 40 27 - - - -
Ga. 65 33 41 47 7 58 - - - -
Fla. 12 35 235 210 208 198 - - - -
E.S. CENTRAL 12 5 813 673 372 469 - - - -
Ky. 3 1 15 30 29 47 - - - -
Tenn. 3 - 563 556 231 360 - - - -
Ala. 5 4 101 47 27 62 - - - -
Miss. 1 - 134 40 85 - - - - -
W.S. CENTRAL 25 31 2,481 1,398 518 518 - - - 2
Ark. - 4 250 125 38 23 - - - -
La. 1 1 66 43 53 96 - - - -
Okla. 23 17 981 336 56 74 - - - -
Tex. 1 9 1,184 894 371 325 - - - 2
MOUNTAIN 68 68 2,043 1,936 536 401 31 67 - 1
Mont. - - 62 40 6 10 - - - -
Idaho 1 2 130 197 62 45 - 1 - -
Wyo. 33 4 21 67 16 12 - - - -
Colo. 6 9 191 235 65 61 - 5 - 1
N. Mex. 8 10 244 385 176 161 2 2 - -
Ariz. 9 17 814 545 131 57 - 8 - -
Utah 6 6 469 400 59 37 29 47 - -
Nev. 5 20 112 67 21 18 - 4 - -
PACIFIC 143 122 3,836 4,665 814 1,084 - 127 - 3
Wash. 2 5 262 345 51 86 - 45 - -
Oreg. 20 14 517 959 36 57 - 2 - -
Calif. 118 101 2,985 3,248 716 924 - 16 - 2
Alaska 1 - 27 19 5 7 - 63 - -
Hawaii 2 2 45 94 6 10 - 1 - 1
Guam - - 2 3 - 4 U - U -
P.R. 1 2 41 43 162 241 4 6 - -
V.I. - - - - - 2 U - U -
Amer. Samoa - - - 5 - - U - U -
C.N.M.I. 10 6 1 15 5 7 U - U -
N: Not notifiable U: Unavailable -: no reported cases
*Of 137 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 32 and of those, 8 were type b.
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UNITED STATES 257 227 10 326 478 92 1,418 1,273 11 94 64
NEW ENGLAND 9 4 - - 8 46 253 195 - 11 14
Maine - - - - 4 - 8 20 - - 1
N.H. - - - - - - 20 15 - - 1
Vt. 1 - - - - - 7 12 - 2 -
Mass. 7 2 - - 2 46 215 138 - 7 2
R.I. - 2 - - - - - - - - -
Conn. 1 - - - 2 - 3 10 - 2 10
MID. ATLANTIC 17 4 2 49 70 7 111 116 - 4 9
Upstate N.Y. - - 1 13 16 2 59 63 - 3 2
N.Y. City 7 - - 13 8 1 17 15 - 1 6
N.J. - 4 U - 9 U - 6 U - 1
Pa. 10 - 1 23 37 4 35 32 - - -
E.N. CENTRAL 9 8 1 71 79 10 168 136 - 3 -
Ohio 2 1 - 27 24 2 75 46 - - -
Ind. - - - 5 5 - 14 15 - - -
Ill. 3 - 1 17 24 7 58 30 - 1 -
Mich. 3 5 - 21 26 1 16 33 - 2 -
Wis. 1 2 - 1 - - 5 12 - - -
W.N. CENTRAL 17 1 - 4 29 - 62 77 - 1 -
Minn. 14 - U 1 2 U 42 27 U - -
Iowa - - - - 8 - 2 2 - 1 -
Mo. 2 1 - 1 16 - 12 20 - - -
N. Dak. - - - 2 - - - 6 - - -
S. Dak. - - - - - - 1 7 - - -
Nebr. - - - - 3 - 1 5 - - -
Kans. 1 - - - - - 4 10 - - -
S. ATLANTIC 5 5 1 45 70 10 163 115 9 23 16
Del. 1 - - - - - 9 6 - - -
Md. 2 - - 13 24 1 56 16 - - -
D.C. - - - - - - - 2 - 1 -
Va. 2 - - 4 14 1 20 8 - 2 -
W. Va. - - - - - - 2 - - - -
N.C. - - 1 10 16 7 36 55 9 9 -
S.C. - - - 5 7 1 10 13 - 1 -
Ga. - 2 - 2 1 - 7 - - - -
Fla. - 3 - 11 8 - 23 15 - 10 16
E.S. CENTRAL - - - 16 7 - 46 39 - 2 -
Ky. - - - - - - 24 7 - - -
Tenn. - - - 2 - - 14 7 - - -
Ala. - - - 3 4 - 4 25 - 2 -
Miss. - - - 11 3 - 4 - N N N
W.S. CENTRAL 2 19 - 14 34 6 37 71 - 2 3
Ark. - 2 - - 5 - 3 9 - - -
La. - 17 - 10 7 - 4 4 - 1 -
Okla. - - - - - - 4 9 - - -
Tex. 2 - - 4 22 6 26 49 - 1 3
MOUNTAIN 68 66 - 20 23 5 162 298 - 6 4
Mont. - - - - 1 1 5 3 - - -
Idaho 1 - - - 2 - 67 74 - 2 -
Wyo. - - - - - 1 1 1 - - -
Colo. 6 26 - 2 - 3 24 46 - 2 -
N. Mex. 2 29 N N N - 29 39 - - -
Ariz. 8 10 - 1 2 - 11 114 - 1 3
Utah 47 - - 2 10 - 6 10 - - 1
Nev. 4 1 - 15 8 - 19 11 - 1 -
PACIFIC 130 120 6 107 158 8 416 226 2 42 18
Wash. 45 17 3 13 10 8 169 41 - 1 -
Oreg. 2 1 N N N - 27 15 - 1 1
Calif. 18 100 2 77 132 - 209 149 2 37 14
Alaska 63 - - 2 12 - 2 - - - -
Hawaii 2 2 1 15 4 - 9 21 - 3 3
Guam - - U 3 3 U - 2 U - 1
P.R. 6 2 - 1 2 - 1 1 - - -
V.I. - - U - 2 U - - U - -
Amer. Samoa - - U - - U - - U - -
C.N.M.I. - - U - - U - - U - -
N: Not notifiable U: Unavailable -: no reported cases
TABLE III. (Cont’d.) Cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination,
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NEW ENGLAND 541 378 102 40 14 7 39
Boston, Mass. 143 92 26 15 4 6 17
Bridgeport, Conn. 30 24 6 - - - 1
Cambridge, Mass. 16 9 5 2 - - 1
Fall River, Mass. 39 30 6 3 - - -
Hartford, Conn. 28 20 3 3 2 - -
Lowell, Mass. 21 16 5 - - - 2
Lynn, Mass. 22 16 5 1 - - 1
New Bedford, Mass. 22 20 - 1 - 1 -
New Haven, Conn. 48 28 13 4 3 - 2
Providence, R.I. 57 44 6 3 4 - 7
Somerville, Mass. 4 3 1 - - - 1
Springfield, Mass. 26 15 9 1 1 - 3
Waterbury, Conn. 26 20 4 2 - - 1
Worcester, Mass. 59 41 13 5 - - 3
MID. ATLANTIC 2,490 1,628 486 274 58 44 115
Albany, N.Y. 37 24 11 - 1 1 3
Allentown, Pa. 23 20 2 1 - - -
Buffalo, N.Y. 75 54 13 5 2 1 2
Camden, N.J. 48 31 9 5 2 1 5
Elizabeth, N.J. 16 11 5 - - - -
Erie, Pa.§ 41 30 6 3 2 - 3
Jersey City, N.J. 45 24 8 9 3 1 1
New York City, N.Y. 1,169 733 243 149 26 18 47
Newark, N.J. 74 26 21 18 7 2 7
Paterson, N.J. 25 17 4 2 - 2 -
Philadelphia, Pa. 500 335 100 45 9 11 23
Pittsburgh, Pa.§ 85 56 17 9 2 1 4
Reading, Pa. 11 8 1 2 - - -
Rochester, N.Y. 110 87 14 8 1 - 4
Schenectady, N.Y. 24 18 3 3 - - 1
Scranton, Pa.§ 24 23 1 - - - 1
Syracuse, N.Y. 105 80 10 9 2 4 10
Trenton, N.J. 28 14 11 2 - 1 -
Utica, N.Y. 19 13 4 2 - - 1
Yonkers, N.Y. 31 24 3 2 1 1 3
E.N. CENTRAL 1,950 1,303 383 160 43 57 104
Akron, Ohio 47 34 7 5 - 1 -
Canton, Ohio 35 23 9 2 - 1 4
Chicago, Ill. 427 239 100 54 10 20 33
Cincinnati, Ohio 105 71 20 7 1 6 7
Cleveland, Ohio 121 78 19 15 3 6 2
Columbus, Ohio 153 111 29 9 2 2 3
Dayton, Ohio 104 77 17 6 2 2 2
Detroit, Mich. 212 121 50 25 8 8 6
Evansville, Ind. 43 33 10 - - - 1
Fort Wayne, Ind. 54 42 8 1 2 1 5
Gary, Ind. 10 4 3 2 1 - -
Grand Rapids, Mich. 47 31 9 4 1 2 3
Indianapolis, Ind. 128 89 25 9 1 4 10
Madison, Wis. 59 45 9 2 2 1 6
Milwaukee, Wis. 132 101 25 4 1 1 9
Peoria, Ill. 42 30 7 3 2 - 3
Rockford, Ill. 45 30 11 3 1 - 4
South Bend, Ind. 47 38 7 2 - - 1
Toledo, Ohio 85 63 9 6 5 2 3
Youngstown, Ohio 54 43 9 1 1 - 2
W.N. CENTRAL 853 582 161 61 25 15 50
Des Moines, Iowa 59 46 10 3 - - 4
Duluth, Minn. 31 20 6 3 - 2 4
Kansas City, Kans. 49 29 12 4 3 1 -
Kansas City, Mo. 92 61 14 5 3 - 7
Lincoln, Nebr. 51 35 10 5 1 - 7
Minneapolis, Minn. 232 157 48 14 7 6 13
Omaha, Nebr. 80 56 14 4 2 4 4
St. Louis, Mo. 120 84 22 10 4 - 5
St. Paul, Minn. 62 44 13 3 1 1 3
Wichita, Kans. 77 50 12 10 4 1 3
S. ATLANTIC 1,162 716 256 131 40 16 60
Atlanta, Ga. 128 69 29 24 4 2 5
Baltimore, Md. 165 99 38 19 4 5 21
Charlotte, N.C. 72 44 13 12 2 1 2
Jacksonville, Fla. 135 93 29 9 2 2 2
Miami, Fla. 96 60 24 10 2 - 1
Norfolk, Va. 44 32 5 4 2 1 -
Richmond, Va. 76 47 19 9 - 1 4
Savannah, Ga. 41 30 7 2 2 - 5
St. Petersburg, Fla. 42 31 9 1 - 1 1
Tampa, Fla. 162 104 35 14 6 - 10
Washington, D.C. 186 100 45 27 11 3 9
Wilmington, Del. 15 7 3 - 5 - -
E.S. CENTRAL 570 388 108 50 12 11 48
Birmingham, Ala. 110 68 23 15 1 2 6
Chattanooga, Tenn. 55 38 11 3 2 1 3
Knoxville, Tenn. 85 61 18 3 2 1 11
Lexington, Ky. 77 49 20 6 1 1 12
Memphis, Tenn. U U U U U U U
Mobile, Ala. 64 47 9 4 1 3 4
Montgomery, Ala. 42 31 4 5 1 1 2
Nashville, Tenn. 137 94 23 14 4 2 10
W.S. CENTRAL 1,482 935 317 150 50 30 84
Austin, Tex. 87 57 17 10 2 1 6
Baton Rouge, La. 47 29 12 4 2 - -
Corpus Christi, Tex. 47 34 10 3 - - 4
Dallas, Tex. 223 132 55 26 8 2 7
El Paso, Tex. 91 63 19 6 2 1 11
Ft. Worth, Tex. 96 66 18 7 1 4 3
Houston, Tex. 353 206 75 52 13 7 26
Little Rock, Ark. 74 33 22 10 4 5 5
New Orleans, La. 105 59 26 10 6 4 -
San Antonio, Tex. 171 120 34 9 5 3 10
Shreveport, La. 73 55 9 3 5 1 6
Tulsa, Okla. 115 81 20 10 2 2 6
MOUNTAIN 850 552 168 93 17 19 47
Albuquerque, N.M. 99 66 16 9 4 4 2
Colo. Springs, Colo. 49 35 4 7 1 2 5
Denver, Colo. 108 69 24 12 1 2 6
Las Vegas, Nev. 138 89 34 10 3 2 12
Ogden, Utah 31 21 4 4 1 1 2
Phoenix, Ariz. 168 99 38 23 1 6 8
Pueblo, Colo. 31 25 3 3 - - 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 97 63 16 12 5 1 4
Tucson, Ariz. 129 85 29 13 1 1 6
PACIFIC 1,908 1,312 356 162 46 32 133
Berkeley, Calif. 22 17 4 1 - - -
Fresno, Calif. 58 41 7 7 1 2 7
Glendale, Calif. 43 36 7 - - - 4
Honolulu, Hawaii 82 63 11 6 1 1 8
Long Beach, Calif. 69 47 8 8 5 1 7
Los Angeles, Calif. 656 433 139 60 18 6 23
Pasadena, Calif. 21 13 4 2 2 - 2
Portland, Oreg. 126 93 19 10 1 3 8
Sacramento, Calif. 127 78 33 10 5 1 15
San Diego, Calif. 126 86 18 13 3 6 18
San Francisco, Calif. 143 83 34 20 4 2 11
San Jose, Calif. 150 110 22 10 3 5 14
Santa Cruz, Calif. 29 20 3 5 1 - 2
Seattle, Wash. 101 79 18 3 1 - 4
Spokane, Wash. 52 40 8 4 - - 5
Tacoma, Wash. 103 73 21 3 1 5 5
TOTAL 11,806
¶
7,794 2,337 1,121 305 231 680
Reporting Area











All  Causes, By Age (Years)
>65 45-64 25-44 1-24 <1
U: Unavailable    -: no reported cases
*Mortality data in this table are voluntarily reported from 121 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of 100,000 or
more. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not
included.
†Pneumonia and influenza.
§Because of changes in reporting methods in these 3 Pennsylvania cities, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete
counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.
¶Total includes unknown ages.
TABLE IV. Deaths in 121 U.S. cities,* week ending
June 22, 1996 (25th Week)
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